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A Triggered Nation: An Argument for 
Extreme Risk Protection Orders 
by CAROLINE SHEN*
Introduction 
In 2017, 15,577 people were killed by guns in the United States, 31,170 
people were injured, and 346 mass shootings1 took place.2  Of those killed 
or injured, 732 were children eleven years of age or younger and 3,235 were 
teens between the ages of 12 and 17.  By the end of 2018, there were 56,868 
incidents involving guns, leading to 14,618 deaths and 28,156 injuries.3
There were 340 mass shootings in total, and 665 children and 2,827 teens 
were killed or injured by gun violence. 
While it is easy to read these statistics as mere numbers, the true gravity 
of this toll on American lives is more apparent when compared to the 
statistics of gun violence in other first-world countries.  Nearly half of the 
number of civilian-owned guns in the world can be found in the U.S., even 
though the U.S. only makes up 4.4 percent of the world’s population.4  As a 
result of this pervasiveness of gun ownership, the U.S. has had six times as 
        *      J.D. Candidate 2019, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  I would like 
to thank Hannah Shearer and the rest of Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence for their 
mentorship, guidance, and continued dedication to the fight against gun violence.  Additionally, I 
would like to thank the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Volume 46 staff for all their hard 
work throughout the publication process.  
 1.  While there is no precise legal definition for what constitutes a mass shooting, the term 
has been previously defined by the Congressional Research Service as “a multiple homicide 
incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms, within one event, and in one or 
more locations in close proximity.”  WILLIAM J. KROUSE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R44126, MASS MURDER WITH FIREARMS: INCIDENTS AND VICTIMS, 1999–2013 2 (2015), https://f 
as.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44126.pdf. 
 2.  Past Summary Ledgers, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.gunviolen 
cearchive.org/past-tolls.  
 3.  Id.
 4.  Id.
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many gun-related deaths as Canada and nearly 16 times as many as 
Germany, both of which have restrictions on gun ownership.5
The American Medical Association has characterized gun violence in 
the United States as “a public health crisis.”6  Yet, Congress has prohibited 
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) from conducting 
further research into the extent of the effects of gun violence in the United 
States.7  Through the tireless efforts of the National Rifles Association 
(“NRA”), a provision known as the “Dickey Amendment”—named after a 
Republican representative from Arkansas who proclaimed himself a “point 
man for the NRA”—was snuck into an appropriations bill and first signed 
into law by President Clinton.8  The provision stipulated that “none of the 
funds made available for injury prevention and control at the [CDC] may be 
used to advocate or promote gun control.”9
Meanwhile, the seminal Supreme Court decision, District of Columbia 
v. Heller,10 remains the utmost authority on the interpretation of the Second 
Amendment today.  The decision was a dramatic departure from the Court’s 
previous interpretation of the Second Amendment in United States v. Miller.
In Miller, the Court unanimously ruled that the “obvious purpose” of the 
Second Amendment was not to ensure the rights of everyday citizens to own 
guns, but rather to “assure the continuation and render possible the 
effectiveness of [the state militia].”11
In 2008, the Court made a complete turnaround in Heller.  Though 
Justice Scalia began his interpretation of the Second Amendment by 
acknowledging that the prefatory clause states and clarifies the purpose of 
the Amendment,12 he then went on to disregard it entirely.  Despite clear 
language in the prefatory clause indicating its application to “[a] well 
regulated militia,” Scalia quickly moved his opinion to a more in depth 
reading of the operative clause regarding “the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms.”  Using a unique concoction of textual and purposive statutory 
 5.  German Lopez, America’s unique gun violence problem, explained in 17 maps and 
charts, VOX (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/2/16399418/us-
gun-violence-statistics-maps-charts.  
 6.  AMA calls gun violence “a public health crisis,” AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS’N (June 14, 
2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/ama-calls-gun-violence-public-health-crisis.
 7.  Id.
 8.  See, Erin Dooley, Here’s why the federal government can’t study gun violence, ABC
NEWS (Oct. 6, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/US/federal-government-study-gun-violence/story?id 
=50300379.  
 9.  Id.
 10.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 11.  United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).  
 12.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.  
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interpretation, combined with what can be characterized as original intent 
(even though he specifically advocates against such interpretation), he 
arrived at the conclusion that the use of the words “the people” in the 
operative clause of the Amendment reflects a “strong presumption”13 that the 
Amendment protects the right of individual citizens to bear arms. 
Since Heller, the NRA has latched onto the decision as proof that the 
Constitution guarantees the individual’s right to gun ownership and that this 
right cannot be infringed upon in any capacity.  Gun control advocates, on 
the other hand, continue to criticize the decision for “def[ying] constitutional 
text and history to create a new private right to be armed.”14  More optimistic 
gun control advocates, however, emphasize certain holes in the decision as 
avenues through which to continue the fight for common sense gun laws.  
One such avenue which remains to be definitively addressed by the Supreme 
Court is what it considers a “presumptively lawful” regulation.  While the 
Court offered examples—including prohibiting firearm possession by felons 
and the mentally ill, forbidding firearm possession in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings, and imposing conditions on the 
commercial sale of firearms15—it set no boundaries within which to consider 
such regulations in practice and merely notes that this list is not exhaustive.16
This Note focuses on a new type of law which utilizes these gaps in the 
Heller decision, capitalizing on the Supreme Court’s allowance of 
prohibiting firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill.  The purpose 
of this Note is to argue for the crucial need for Extreme Risk Protection 
Orders and the feasibility of passing such laws in each of the twelve federal 
circuits.  This involves an analysis of possible issues and/or constitutional 
questions that may arise or be used to argue against the implementation of 
such laws in a given jurisdiction. 
 13.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.  
 14.  Dennis A. Henigan, Symposium: The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms 
After D.C. v. Heller: The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1209 (2009). 
 15.  Heller, 554 U.S at 626–27.  
 16.  Id. at 627 n.26.  
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I.  The United States is Unique in its Lack of
Common Sense Gun Control 
Studies have substantially demonstrated that more gun control 
correlates with fewer firearm deaths.17  For instance, one study done for the 
American Public Health Association revealed that each percentage point 
increase in gun ownership correlated with a nearly equal percentage increase 
in the firearm homicide rate.18  The NRA and its supporters often counter 
this clear correlation by arguing that there is simply more crime in the U.S. 
than in other countries, and that therefore it is inaccurate to tie higher death 
rates to the prevalence of guns.  However, a number of studies have shown 
otherwise.  For example, the research illustrated in the book Crime is Not the 
Problem by Berkeley’s Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, shows that 
other crimes, such as robbery and assault, occur at equivalent rates, if not 
higher, in several Western nations.19
The effects of the lack of stricter regulations on gun ownership in the 
U.S. are perhaps clearest when compared to countries with such stricter 
regulations.  One go-to example is Japan.  Out of its population of 127 
million people, Japan suffers about 10 or less gun deaths per year.20  This is 
a shockingly small number when compared to the roughly 37,200 gun deaths 
in the U.S. each year21 out of a population of roughly 328 million.22  Japan 
achieves this low number at least in part through its notably strict regulations 
on the ownership of firearms by the general population, as well as limited 
possession among its police force.23  In order to own a gun in Japan, one 
must attend an all-day class, pass a written test, pass a shooting-range test 
 17.  See e.g., John W. Schoen, States with strict gun laws have fewer firearm deaths. Here’s 
how your state stacks up, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/27/states-with-
strict-gun-laws-have-fewer-firearms-deaths-heres-how-your-state-stacks-up.html (analyzing the 
results of a study conducted by the CDC tracking firearm deaths in each state, and a study conducted 
by Boston University’s School of Public Health tracking different provisions of gun laws in each 
state, and combining this data to show the number of gun deaths versus gun laws in each state).  
 18.  Michael Siegel et al., The Relationship Between Gun Ownership and Firearm Homicide 
Rates in the United States, 1981-2010, AJPH (Oct. 9, 2013), http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/fu 
ll/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301409.  
 19.  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM (1997).  
 20.  Chris Weller, Japan has almost completely eliminated gun deaths—here’s how,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/gun-control-how-japan-has-
almost-completely-eliminated-gun-deaths-2017-10. 
 21.  Laura Santhanam, There’s a new global ranking of gun deaths. Here’s where the U.S. 
stands, KQED (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/theres-a-new-global-rankin 
g-of-gun-deaths-heres-where-the-u-s-stands.
 22.  U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last visited Jan. 6, 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/popclock. 
 23.  Weller, supra note 20.  
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with a score of at least 95 percent, pass a mental-health evaluation, and pass 
an extensive background check.24  Even after this extensive application 
process, individuals are only allowed to purchase shotguns and air rifles.25
They are further required to retake both the initial class and the initial written 
exam every three years if they wish to maintain their license.26
Australia is another example of the results that can be achieved even 
when less restrictions are placed on gun ownership.  After a mass shooting 
at a cafe in 1996, which led to the deaths of 35 people and the injury of 23, 
the country enacted a slew of laws to ensure such a massacre never occurred 
again.27  These included “uniform gun registration, repudiation of self-
defense as a legitimate reason to hold a firearm license, locked storage, a ban 
on private gun sales and civilian ownership of semiautomatic rifles and 
pump-action shotguns, and standardized penalties.”28  Since the enactment 
of these laws, no mass shooting has occurred in Australia.29  In comparison, 
before 1996, approximately three mass shootings occurred every year.30  By 
projecting this rate forward, the Australian Coalition for Gun Control 
concluded that approximately 16 mass shootings have been avoided in 
Australia as of February 2018.31  Despite the difference in the level of 
restrictive gun legislation in comparison to that in Japan, the increase of 
ownership and purchase restrictions in Australia similarly correlated with a 
drastic decrease in the gun-related deaths that occur in the country each year. 
Perhaps even more persuasive is what has been shown within the U.S., 
in states that have the most gun laws.  In a study conducted by Dr. Eric W. 
Fleegler and his colleagues at Boston Children’s Hospital, researchers found 
that states with more restrictive gun laws collectively have a 42 percent lower 
rate of gun-related deaths when compared to states with the fewest number 
of gun laws.32  They further noted that states with the lowest gun-ownership 
rates also have the lowest gun-mortality rates.33
 24.  Weller, supra note 20.
 25.  Id.
 26.  Id.
 27.  Maggie Fox, Australian gun laws stopped 16 mass shootings, new calculations show,
NBC NEWS (last updated Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/australian 
-gun-laws-stopped-16-mass-shootings-new-calculations-show-n855946.  
 28.  Id.
 29.  Id.
 30.  Id.
 31.  Id.
 32.  Fewer gun deaths in states with most gun laws, study finds, NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/06/17213303-fewer-gun-deaths-in-states-with-most-
gun-laws-study-finds?lite.  
 33.  Id.
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Arguably the most significant barrier to gun control legislation is the 
existence and vast influence of the gun lobby, which is unique to the United 
States.  In the 2016 election, the NRA contributed $3.1 million to Donald 
Trump’s campaign.34  It has contributed at least another $4.1 million to 
current members of Congress as of October 2017.35  Beyond mere campaign 
contributions, the NRA also exerts powerful influence over its more than five 
million members.  It constantly communicates with its members about gun 
issues and advises them on how to vote and which campaigns to finance on 
an individual capacity.36  This political power allows the NRA to block any 
piece of gun legislation it deems too restrictive on the Second Amendment 
right of its constituents. 
II.  Why Extreme Risk Protection Orders? 
One form of common sense gun legislation which has the potential to 
bridge the gap between NRA supporters and gun control advocates are 
Extreme Risk Protection Orders (“ERPOs”), otherwise known as Gun 
Violence Restraining Orders.  ERPOs are protective orders issued by a court 
aimed at prohibiting certain individuals from owning or possessing firearms 
and ammunition.  They are intended to provide community members with a 
formal legal process through which to prevent gun violence before it occurs.   
While other types of gun control laws are often met with much 
resentment from pro-gun advocates, ERPOs target the issue of gun violence 
in such a way as to consolidate differing opinions across political platforms.  
They are aimed at a narrow sect of the population which exhibits a risk to 
themselves or others, individuals who pro-gun advocates point to as the 
cause of all mass shootings, after the fact.37  Even John McCain, who has 
received the highest amount of NRA funding over the course of his career of 
 34.  Sarah Binder, Three reasons you should expect congressional gridlock on gun control,
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/ 
02/27/yes-you-can-expect-congressional-gridlock-on-gun-regulations-these-are-the-3-biggest-
barriers-to-action/?utm_term=.358e86cc2b4d.  
 35.  Aaron Williams, Have your representatives in Congress received donations from the 
NRA?, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2018), http://linkis.com/washingtonpost.com/aPeFE.  
 36.  Leigh Ann Caldwell, How the NRA Exerts Influence Beyond Political Contributions,
NBC NEWS (June 15, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/orlando-nightclub-massacre/nra-
s-political-influence-far-goes-beyond-campaign-contributions-n593051.  
 37.  See Jonathan M. Metzl et al., Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics of 
American Firearms, 105(2) AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 240–59 (Feb. 2015).  See also Ann Coulter, 
Guns Don’t Kill People, the Mentally Ill Do (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.anncoulter.com/columns/2 
013-01-16.html.
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any other current House or Senate member at $7,740,521,38 has urged for 
“sensible laws so that crazy people can’t get guns.”39  Despite his 
troublesome use of the term “crazy people,” his argument runs parallel to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller: A piece of legislation may be justifiable 
if it restricts certain dangerous individuals from possessing firearms.  But 
how can these dangerous individuals be readily identified? 
Studies conducted by the Consortium for Risk-Based Firearms Policy 
in 2013 have shown that individuals who are engaged in certain dangerous 
behaviors are significantly more likely to be a danger to themselves or others 
within the near future.40  Recent mass shootings, such as the one in Isla Vista, 
California in 2015, have further shown that family and close friends are often 
the first to notice such dangerous behaviors prior to an individual’s 
involvement in a mass shooting.  The shooter in the Isla Vista incident, Elliot 
Rodger, spent over a year planning his attack.41  This premeditation included 
amassing numerous firearms and training himself to kill as many people as 
possible.  There were at least 14 separate instances, prior to the shooting, 
during which local deputies were notified of Rodger’s dangerous behavior, 
including a welfare check requested by his concerned mother.42  Rodger’s 
parents also tried to contact his therapist three weeks before the shooting due 
to their concerns about his behavior.  Though the therapist contacted the 
police, none of the parties had the legal means by which to remove Rodger’s 
access to guns, which subsequently led to the deaths of three people, the 
wounding of 13 others, and ultimately Rodger’s suicide.43
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) conducted a study in June 
of 2018 detailing certain dangerous behaviors commonly exhibited by active 
 38.  David Leonhardt et al., Thoughts and Prayers and N.R.A. Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/04/opinion/thoughts-prayers-nra-funding-se 
nators.html.  
 39.  Tania Lombrozo, Is Gun Violence Due To Dangerous People Or Dangerous Guns?, NPR 
(Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2015/08/31/436264866/is-gun-violence-due-
to-dangerous-people-or-dangerous-guns.  
 40.  See, Consortium for Risk-Based Firearms Policy, Guns, Public Health, and Mental 
Illness: An Evidence-Based Approach for State Policy, JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR GUN POL’Y AND 
RESEARCH (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-ce 
nter-for-gun-policy-and-research/publications/GPHMI-State.pdf.
 41.  Joseph Serna, Elliot Rodger meticulously planned Isla Vista rampage, report says, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-barbara-isla-vista-ram 
page-investigation-20150219-story.html.  
 42.  Id.
 43.  Joe Mozingo, Frantic parents of shooting suspect raced to Isla Vista during rampage,
L.A. TIMES, (May 25, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-frantic-parents-isla-
vista-shootings-20140525-story.html.   
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shooters just prior to an attack.44  The study, which examined 63 active 
shooting incidents in the U.S. between 2000 and 2013, pointed to a common 
history among a majority of active shooters of “abusive, harassing, and 
oppressive” behaviors.45  Such behaviors manifested most commonly in the 
form of declining mental health, injury to or lack of interpersonal 
relationships, discussion of the planned attack, and suicidal ideation.46  On 
average, each active shooter in the study exhibited 4.7 examples of such 
concerning behavior before committing their attacks and 77 percent spent a 
week or more planning these attacks.47  The study also noted that those most 
likely to identify these examples of concerning behavior are family and 
friends closest to the potential shooter. 
Despite these indications of noticeable behaviors and the ability of 
those closest to the individual to identify such behaviors, most jurisdictions 
provide no legal means by which family, close friends, or law enforcement 
officials can restrict a dangerous individual from accessing and obtaining 
firearms.  Under federal law, an individual suffering from mental instability 
or mental illness has equal access to purchase or possess firearms unless the 
individual has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, been 
found not guilty by reason of insanity, or undergone some other formalized 
court proceeding regarding his or her mental illness.48
However, a new trend is on the horizon.  In the last two years, a number 
of states have begun to pass ERPO laws, and the momentum is building for 
other states to follow suit.  Such legislation exists in California, Washington, 
Oregon, Florida, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, and Massachusetts.  Sadly, 
the passing of such legislation often occurs in the wake of a mass shooting 
within that state.  In her speech following the deadliest school shootings in 
American history,49 Stoneman Douglas High School senior, Emma 
Gonzalez, called attention to the fact that the shooter was known to be a 
danger to others.  In her words, “[n]eighbors and classmates knew he was a 
big problem.  We [reported his erratic behavior] time and time again.  Since 
he was in middle school.  It was no surprise to anyone who knew him to hear 
 44.  James Silver et al., A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the United 
States Between 2000 and 2013, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (June 2018), https://www.f 
bi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view.
 45.  Id.
 46.  Id.
 47.  Silver, supra note 44.
 48.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018).  
 49.  Florida student Emma Gonzalez to lawmakers and gun advocates: ‘We call BS’, CNN 
(Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/17/us/florida-student-emma-gonzalez-speech/inde
x.html.
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that he was the shooter.”50  The #NeverAgain movement started by Gonzalez 
and the other students of Stoneman Douglas has led to countless marches 
across the nation in an effort to demand more common sense gun laws.  As 
a result, on March 7, 2018, Senator Marco Rubio (who has received the sixth 
highest amount of NRA contributions in the Senate at $3,303,35551) held a 
news conference proposing that Florida pass an ERPO law, saying “it would 
be a tool . . . [to prevent] dangerous individuals from being able to take the 
next step and actually take the lives of innocent people.”52
III.  The Purpose and Process of Obtaining an ERPO 
California’s ERPO law53 is worth detailing because it offers a 
framework with which to think about ERPOs generally.  California modeled 
its law on existing state legislation which prohibits those charged with 
domestic violence from owning and possessing firearms.54  Under 
California’s ERPO law, an immediate family member or a law enforcement 
officer may request a gun violence protective order to prohibit an individual 
“from having in his or her custody or control, owning, purchasing, 
possessing, or receiving any firearms or ammunition”55 for a period of one 
year.  A temporary ex parte order may also be issued by the court to prohibit 
the subject of the petition from purchasing or possessing firearms and 
ammunition prior to the hearing for a one-year protective order, if the court 
deems this necessary based on the circumstances. 
Upon the issuance of a one-year protective order (or earlier if an ex 
parte order is issued), the court will order the respondent to surrender all 
firearms and ammunition within their control, possession, or ownership to 
their local law enforcement agency or otherwise to provide a receipt showing 
the sale of those firearms to a licensed firearm dealer.56  Any purchase or 
possession of a firearm or ammunition following the issuance of the 
protective order will constitute a misdemeanor.57  The individual will 
subsequently be prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm or 
 50.  Florida student Emma Gonzalez to lawmakers and gun advocates, supra note 49.
 51.  Leonhardt et al., supra note 38.
 52.  Alex Leary, Rubio, Nelson pitch idea to encourage states to adopt ‘gun violence 
restraining orders’, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics 
/buzz/2018/03/07/rubio-nelson-pitch-idea-to-encourage-states-to-adopt-gun-violence-restraining-
orders/.
 53.  CAL. PEN. CODE § 18100 (West 2014).  
 54.  CAL. PEN. CODE § 29805 (West 2011).  
 55.  CAL. PEN. CODE § 18175 (West 2014).  
 56.  CAL. PEN. CODE § 18120 (West 2014).  
 57.  CAL. PEN. CODE § 18205 (West 2014).  
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ammunition for an additional five years, starting on the date the existing 
protective order expires.  At any time during the one-year period, the subject 
of the protective order may submit one written request for a hearing to 
terminate the order based on an argument that he or she does not pose—or 
no longer poses—a threat to themselves or others.58
In the three months before the order is due to expire, the petitioner may 
request a renewal of the restraining order for another year.59  If the order is 
terminated or expires without being renewed, the law enforcement agency 
will notify the respondent that he or she may request the return of their 
firearms or ammunition. 
IV.  Passing an ERPO Law is Feasible in Each of the  
Twelve Federal Circuits 
Many circuits—namely the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits—have considered Second Amendment challenges in the context of 
domestic violence restraining orders, upon which ERPOs are based.  Cases 
about 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9) are therefore particularly 
analogous and suggestive of the circuits’ expected decisions if an ERPO law 
is introduced and challenged in those circuits.  Similarly analogous are cases 
related to individuals (1) previously involuntarily committed to a mental 
institution, (2) previously convicted of a misdemeanor felony, (3) who are 
known substance abusers, and (4) who are otherwise deemed a danger to 
themselves or others.  Together, these make up most of the Second 
Amendment case law considered thus far in each of the twelve circuits. 
From the case law examined in the following sub-sections, it appears 
that ERPOs are likely to be upheld as constitutional in each of the twelve 
circuits because (1) they are narrowly tailored to accomplish a legitimate 
government interest and (2) the limit on one’s Second Amendment right to 
bear arms is minimal and temporary. 
A.  United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
1. United States v. Torres-Rosario
Defendant, Torres-Rosario, was arrested for the sale and possession of 
drugs, and indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).60  His primary argument was that § 922(g)(1) 
constituted an unconstitutional categorical ban, particularly in his case 
 58.  CAL. PEN. CODE § 18185 (West 2014). 
 59.  CAL. PEN. CODE § 18190 (West 2014). 
 60.  United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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because though he had prior convictions, none were for violent felonies.61
The court considered a decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court, 
wherein a specific felony conviction was deemed insufficient to deprive the 
defendant of his Second Amendment rights.62  However, this decision was 
criticized because it urged a case-by-case analysis, which the court in Torres-
Rosario believed to be too inconsistent and conducive to administrative 
issues in practice.63
The court also considered the argument that “felons are more likely to 
commit violent crimes than are other law-abiding citizens,” but conceded 
that the Heller decision did not specifically allow for a categorical ban in 
cases that involve “tame and technical” activities.64  However, the court 
ultimately reasoned that this was not the case here.  The main purpose of a 
firearm in the possession of a drug dealer is to protect the drugs.65  Thus, 
drug dealing is not a “tame” felony, but rather one that ubiquitously involves 
violence.66  For that reason, a categorical ban on the possession of firearms 
by such a felon is “presumptively lawful” under Heller.67
2. United States v. Booker
Defendant, Booker, was found in possession of seven firearms eight 
years after he was convicted of assault against his then-wife.68  He was 
indicted on two counts of knowing possession of a firearm by an individual 
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).69  In his motion to dismiss, he argued that § 922(g)(9)’s 
restriction on individual possession of firearms violates the Second 
Amendment.70  The First Circuit referenced the Heller decision in order to 
delineate that there are “presumptively lawful” regulations which apply to 
categories of individuals whose gun possession, ownership, and/or use may 
be regulated without violating the Second Amendment.71  Citing the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Skoien, the First Circuit asserted that 
“preventing armed mayhem” is an undeniably important governmental 
 61.  Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d at 113.  
 62.  Britt v. State, 363 N.C. 546 (N.C. 2009).  
 63.  Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d at 113. 
 64.  Id.
 65.  Id. at 114. 
 66.  Id. at 113.
 67.  Id.
 68.  United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 69.  Id.
 70.  Id.
 71.  Id. at 24.  
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objective.72  It further referenced figures collected by the Justice Department 
on the increased risk of homicide by convicted domestic abusers with guns 
and the recidivism rates of domestic violence.  From this data, the court 
concluded that § 922(g)(9) substantially promotes the government interest of 
preventing domestic gun violence.73
3. Pineiro v. Gemme
Plaintiff, Pineiro, applied for an unrestricted license to carry in 
Massachusetts as a result of the violent crimes occurring around his office 
building.74  Such an unrestricted license would allow him to carry a 
concealed weapon in public for self-defense.  However, he was granted a 
license subject to the restriction that he use his firearms only for the purpose 
of sport and target-shooting.75  Massachusetts courts have distinguished 
between a “proper purpose” for obtaining a firearm and a “suitable person” 
determination as separate requirements for distributing a license to carry in 
the state.76  Here, Plaintiff’s stated purpose for applying for a license was to 
avoid “spend[ing] his entire life behind locked doors [and to prevent 
becoming] a potential victim of crimes.”77  The licensing authority decided 
that this was not a sufficient reason to grant a concealed carry license.78
Plaintiff claimed the statute’s “suitable person” standard violated his 
Second Amendment rights because it was “subjective and unattainable.”79
Plaintiff also challenged the state law’s “proper purpose” requirement, which 
requires an applicant to show that the license is being sought with “good 
reason to fear injury to his person or property.”80  Plaintiff asserted that self-
defense is a “core lawful purpose” protected by the Second Amendment (as 
was stated in Heller) and thereby the state was not permitted to further limit 
gun possession.81 Finally, Plaintiff challenged the licensing authority’s 
power to decide whether to impose restrictions on an applicant’s ability to 
carry a weapon, arguing that this power is unconstitutional.82
 72.  United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 73.  Booker, 644 F.3d at 25–26.  
 74.  Pineiro v. Gemme, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117749 at *2–3 (2011). 
 75.  Id. at *3–4. 
 76.  Id. at *6–7.  
 77.  Id. at *7.  
 78.  Id.
 79.  Id. at *11. 
 80.  Id. at *11–12. 
 81.  Id. at *12.  
 82.  Id. at *13.  
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In deciding on these issues, the court considered whether or not to apply 
the Pullman abstention.  This principle was designed on the premise that 
“federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments 
fairly open to interpretation until the state courts have been afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to pass upon them.”83  Abstention is appropriate only 
where (1) the state law is ambiguous and (2) deciding the issue regarding the 
state law may avoid the need to resolve a significant federal constitutional 
question.84  The court ruled that the Pullman abstention did not apply to 
Plaintiff’s first claim because “suitable person” had been clearly defined in 
Massachusetts case law to mean “a person who is sufficiently responsible 
and skilled with firearms to hold a license without posing a risk to public 
safety.”85  “Good reason to fear injury” is likewise clearly defined in 
Massachusetts case law;86 the statute requires that an applicant demonstrate 
some specific circumstance giving rise to fear beyond the risks faced by the 
public at large.87  The court also ruled that the delegation of license 
restriction authority was unambiguous.88  The Appeals Court of 
Massachusetts ruled in Ruggiero v. Police Commissioner of Boston that 
determinations relating to the “suitable person” and “proper purpose” 
requirements may only be reversed if they are “arbitrary, capricious or an 
abuse of discretion.”89
4.  Summary and Application 
In U.S. v. Torres-Rosario, the court shied away from creating a 
precedent of case-by-case analysis and instead decided that certain 
dangerous individuals may be prohibited from possessing or purchasing 
firearms via a categorical ban.  The First Circuit reasoned that allowing drug 
dealers to possess guns for the purpose of defending their drugs was not a 
purpose protected by the Second Amendment, based on its interpretation of 
the Heller decision.  Because ERPO laws specifically address individuals 
who exhibit dangerous behaviors and because these individuals’ main 
purpose for possessing a firearm is likely to harm others or themselves (and 
not for self-defense), it is likely that a claim against an ERPO law would 
yield a result comparable to that in U.S. v. Torres-Rosario.
 83.  Pineiro, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117749 at *14.
 84.  Id.
 85.  Id. at *19.  
 86.  Id. at *22. 
 87.  Id. at *22–23.  
 88.  Id. at *25.  
 89.  Ruggiero v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 261 (1984).  
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By the same logic used in U.S. v. Booker, the First Circuit will certainly 
deem it appropriate to prevent mentally ill individuals from possessing, 
owning, or using firearms, as this category of individuals is explicitly 
mentioned in the Heller decision.  If the court decides that this categorical 
prohibition would help keep deadly weapons out of the hands of individuals 
that pose a potential danger to the public, then ERPOs should likewise be 
permissible since they also target individuals who pose a risk of danger to 
themselves or others.  The decision in Booker thus makes it likely that a 
challenge to an ERPO law in the First Circuit would be unsuccessful 
because, as the court stated in Booker, protecting against gun violence is an 
important and legitimate government interest.90
The decision in Pineiro v. Gemme suggests that questions relating to 
requirements similar to Massachusetts’s “suitable person” and “proper 
purpose” requirements may be raised in an attempt to implement an ERPO 
law.  However, as the court ruled in Pineiro, a claim will not require a 
constitutional review if the state statute in question is not ambiguous. 
B.  United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
1. Libertarian Party v. Cuomo
The plaintiffs in this case argued that New York State’s firearms 
licensing laws—which required a showing of good moral character and 
proper cause—were unconstitutional.91  In considering their case, the court 
defined the core Second Amendment right as the “right to possess handguns 
in defense of hearth and home.”92  While the New York laws encroached on 
this right, they did so to a marginal degree; “law-abiding, responsible citizens 
face[d] nothing more than time, expense, and questioning of close friends or 
relatives.”93  The laws were designed to ensure that “only law-abiding, 
responsible citizens [were] allowed to possess a firearm . . . by ensuring that 
classes of individuals who [did] not have the necessary character and 
qualities to possess firearms [were] not able to do so.”94  Therefore, the court 
ruled in favor of the defendants. 
 90.  United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 26 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 91.  Libertarian Party v. Cuomo, 300 F. Supp. 3d 424, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).  
 92.  Id. at 442 (internal quotations omitted). 
 93.  Id. at 443.  
 94.  Id. at 443–44. 
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2. State v. Hope
The Connecticut Appellate Court ruled that similar restrictions of up to 
one year on those who pose a risk of imminent physical harm to themselves 
or others was “an example of the longstanding presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures articulated in [Heller].”95  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the statute in question did not violate the Second 
Amendment.96
3.  Connecticut’s Risk Warrant Gun Removal Law 
Connecticut was the first state to pass a law in 1999 authorizing police 
to temporarily remove guns from individuals who they had probable cause 
to believe posed a danger to themselves or others.  The law was passed after 
a highly publicized mass shooting in the state.  Part of the design of this 
Connecticut risk warrant gun removal law was meant to ensure that the 
respondent whose guns were being removed would retain his or her due 
process rights.  These precautions included a three-fold review process, 
including a reflection on the situation and facts at hand by the police, the 
State’s Attorney, and a judge.97
Following the passing of this law, researchers at Duke University began 
conducting a study to analyze the outcomes of the law.98  The study spanned 
from 1999 through 2013.  During the interviews conducted as part of the 
study, a number of individuals expressed concern over the effectiveness of 
having such a cumbersome three-fold review process, and it was this concern 
which prevented more extensive application of the Connecticut law.99  In 
spite of these extensive hurdles to implementation, the study did see a 
noticeable increase of the number of gun removal cases following the mass 
shooting at Virginia Tech University in 2007.100  Overall, the study 
concluded that the Connecticut law was a useful tool for preventing gun 
violence, and for reducing suicide rates in particular.101
 95.  Hope v. State, 163 Conn. App. 36, 43 (2016).  
 96.  Id.  at 43. 
 97.  See, Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-
Based Gun Removal Law: Does it Prevent Suicides? 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 180 (2017).   
 98.  Id. at 180.  
 99.  Id. at 205. 
 100.  Id. at 189.  
 101.  Id. at 205–08. 
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4.  Summary and Application 
The lack of relevant case law in the Second Circuit does not yield any 
certain conclusions in this jurisdiction.  However, Libertarian Party v. 
Cuomo established that a restriction on firearm possession based on an 
individual’s moral character and fitness is permissible.  This suggests that a 
comparable restriction based on the risk an individual poses to themselves or 
others may similarly be argued to encroach only marginally on the core right 
of the Second Amendment.  State v. Hope further suggests that a one-year 
protective order constructed like that in California will likely not meet 
opposition as to the length of time for which the ban spans. 
While the Connecticut study is somewhat persuasive and reveals some 
correlation between the implementation of the law and a decrease in gun 
violence and gun-related suicides in particular, it is not a conclusive study.  
It also questions the plausibility of implementing such a cumbersome review 
process in every jurisdiction.  Further, it is a limited version of an ERPO 
(allowing only the police to petition for a warrant to remove an individual’s 
firearms) and therefore the findings are of limited scope. 
C.  United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
1. Keyes v. Lynch
Plaintiff Yox was involuntarily committed to psychiatric hospital when 
he was 15 years old, while he was grappling with his parents’ divorce.102
Plaintiff rested his argument on the assumption that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Heller prohibited firearm possession by persons who are 
currently mentally ill.103  On the other hand, Defendants’ relied on the theory 
that all persons who have experienced some form of mental illness at some 
point in their lives are more prone to violent or dangerous behavior and are, 
thereby, the exact class of individuals the Supreme Court meant to prohibit 
from firearm possession.104  The court in this case acknowledged that there 
are certain mental illnesses, such as anxiety and ADHD, that may be 
considered more “temporary” and not dangerous.105  While it is unclear what 
the Supreme Court meant to include under the umbrella term of “mentally 
ill,” this court reasoned that, at the very least, that definition must include 
 102.  Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 706–07 (M.D. Pa. 2016).   
 103.  Id. at 719.  
 104.  Id. at 719–20.  
 105.  Id. at 719.  
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individuals who had mental impairments that made them a danger to 
themselves or others.106
Here, Defendants failed to provide evidence of any subsequent episodes 
of mental illness exhibited by Yox or that he misused firearms in his 
professional capacity.107  Though Yox exhibited behavior dangerous to 
himself and possibly others when he was involuntarily committed, the court 
decided that there was no current “continuing threat.”108  (The psychological 
evaluation, which said as much, proved especially convincing.)  The court 
therefore ruled in favor of Yox on his Second Amendment claim.109
2.  Summary and Application 
Though sparse, case law in the Third Circuit’s jurisdiction suggests that 
the existence of mental illness alone is not an automatic and absolute bar to 
possession of a firearm.  That the court in Keyes differentiated certain mental 
illnesses as temporary and not dangerous may provide an argument against 
certain ERPO petitions that may be brought, if such laws were to be 
introduced into this jurisdiction.  For example, if an individual exhibited 
dangerous behaviors, prompting a relative to file for an ERPO, that 
individual may be able to argue at his or her hearing that the dangerous 
behaviors were a temporary effect of a mental illness rather than an episode 
that may reoccur in the future.  A psychological evaluation affirming that 
argument would prove particularly persuading, as in the case with Yox.  
However, this case alone is not necessarily dispositive of whether an ERPO 
law as a whole would encounter issues that would make implementation 
impossible in this jurisdiction. 
D.  United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
1. United States v. Chapman
Defendant, Chapman, attempted to kill himself and shoot his ex-wife 
with at least three firearms in his possession at the time.110  Defendant’s then-
girlfriend subsequently filed a domestic violence protective order against 
him, which he contested on the basis of a violation of his right to self-
defense.111  The Fourth Circuit refrained from deciding on the Second 
 106.  Keyes, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 719–20.  
 107.  Id. at 720.  
 108.  Id. at 720. 
109.  Id. at 722.  
 110.  United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2012).  
 111.  Id. at 224.  
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Amendment challenge in this case because it determined that this was 
unnecessary given that the law in question survives intermediate scrutiny.112
In the court’s opinion, the law survived intermediate scrutiny because it 
constituted an “exceedingly narrow” “prohibitory sweep.”113
As part of its argument, the government provided social science 
evidence proving that: 
(1) domestic violence is a serious problem in the U.S., (2) the rate 
of recidivism among domestic violence misdemeanants is 
substantial, (3) the use of firearms in connection with domestic 
violence is all too common, (4) the use of firearms in connection 
with domestic violence increases the risk of injury or homicide 
during a domestic violence incident, and (5) the use of firearms 
in connection with domestic violence often leads to injury or 
homicide.114
The court found this evidence persuasive in showing that the 
government met its burden of establishing a reasonable fit between the 
substantial governmental objective of preventing domestic gun violence and 
keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers. 
2. United States v. Conrad
The court concluded here that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits 
firearm possession by unlawful users of controlled substances, does not 
violate the Second Amendment.115  The law passes the intermediate scrutiny 
standard because it is limited in its temporal scope and because the 
government submitted sufficient evidence demonstrating a “nexus between 
controlled substances and crime.”116  With regard to the temporal scope, the 
law prohibits firearm possession only if the individual is currently a user or 
addict.  The prohibition ends when a person is no longer using drugs.  With 
regard to the nexus, the government provided scientific studies affirming 
their stance.
 112.  Chapman, 666 F.3d at 228.  
 113.  Id. at 228.  
 114.  Id. at 230.  
 115.  United States v. Conrad, 923 F. Supp. 2d 843, 851 (W.D. Va. 2013).   
 116.  Id. at 850.  
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3. United States v. Mudlock
Defendant, Mudlock, was arrested after he called 911 stating he was 
going to kill himself and that he would shoot any law enforcement officer 
who approached his home to stop him.117  During this time, Defendant had a 
domestic restraining order filed against him, barring him from possessing a 
firearm for one year.118  Defendant challenged the restraining order, arguing 
that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) violated his Second Amendment rights.119  The 
Fourth Circuit disagreed because § 922(g)(8) provides a time-limited 
restriction, a hearing prior to the triggering of the firearm restriction, and was 
put in place for the purpose of avoiding reasonable fear of bodily injury.  The 
court thereby found that there was a reasonable fit between the statute and 
“the substantial governmental objective of reducing domestic gun 
violence.”120
4.  Summary and Application 
Based on the rulings in Chapman, Conrad, and Mudlock, if an ERPO 
survives intermediate scrutiny, then a Second Amendment challenge will not 
be considered.  It is likely that this will be the case because ERPOs are 
targeted specifically at a group of individuals deemed by those close to them 
to exhibit dangerous behavior.  Therefore, a law aimed at preventing any 
dangerous behavior by keeping firearms out of the hands of those likely to 
be engaged in such dangerous behavior meets the reasonable fit test under 
intermediate scrutiny.  An ERPO further passes the intermediate scrutiny 
standard because it provides for only a temporary (one-year) prohibition of 
firearm possession, as in Conrad and Mudlock.  Similar to statute at issue in 
those cases, an ERPO law also requires a hearing prior to the actual 
triggering of the firearm prohibition. 
E.  United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
1. United States v. Anderson
Defendant, Anderson, challenged his conviction as a felon in possession 
of a firearm by arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated his Second 
Amendment rights.121  The court reaffirmed its previous decision,122 holding 
 117.  United States v. Mudlock, 483 F. App’x 823, 825 (4th Cir. 2012).  
 118.  Id. at 826. 
 119.  Mudlock, 483 F. App’x at 826. 
 120.  Id. at 828.  
 121.  United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).   
 122.  United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 633–34 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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that § 922(g) does not violate the Second Amendment and that Heller
provided no basis for reconsidering that decision.123  According to the Fifth 
Circuit’s precedent, “limited, narrowly tailored exceptions or restrictions for 
particular cases that are reasonable and not inconsistent with the right of 
Americans generally to individually keep and bear their private arms as 
historically understood in this country . . .”124  Further, the Fifth Circuit 
previously noted that “those of unsound mind may be prohibited from 
possessing firearms.”125
2. Piscitello v. Bragg
The District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected Piscitello’s 
Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which makes it 
unlawful for a person using a controlled substance to possess a firearm.126
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court explained in Heller that there are 
certain exceptions to the right to possess a firearm.127  While certain 
exceptions were enumerated in the Heller decision, the Supreme Court noted 
that the list was not meant to be exhaustive, implying that there are other 
categories of exceptions which Congress could regulate.128  The court thus 
concluded that Congress’s determination that the prohibition of firearm 
possession by those unlawfully using or addicted to controlled substances is 
consistent with “well-rooted, public-safety-based-exceptions to the Second 
Amendment right.”129
3.  Summary and Application 
The reasoning in the Fifth Circuit’s precedents, cited in Anderson,
suggests the court would uphold an ERPO law because it is designed to 
temporarily prohibit firearm possession by “those of unsound mind,” so long 
as the ERPO law is applied in a narrow set of “reasonable” cases.  The 
rationale in Piscitello suggests that an ERPO law would be upheld since such 
laws are similarly based on reasonable determinations that people who 
demonstrably pose a danger to themselves or others should not be allowed 
to have easy access to firearms. 
 123.  Anderson, 559 F.3d at 352.  
 124.  United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001).  
 125.  Id. at 261. 
 126.  Piscitello v. Bragg, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21658 at *11 (W.D. Tex. 2009).   
 127.  Id. at *12.  
 128.  Id.
 129.  Id.
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F.  United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
1. Stimmel v. Sessions
Plaintiff, Stimmel, was barred from purchasing a firearm under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) due to his prior conviction of misdemeanor domestic 
violence.130  In his appeal, Plaintiff argues that § 922(g)(9) placed an 
unconstitutional burden on his Second Amendment rights.131  The court 
reasoned that the core of the Second Amendment’s protections pertain to the 
rights of “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” which lends itself to the 
presumption that some individuals may not fall under such a characterization 
and would thereby be “disqualified from exercising Second Amendment 
rights.”132  Thus, the court determined that “some categorical 
disqualifications are permissible” in order to enforce important 
governmental interests, such as protecting victims of domestic violence.133
2. Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department
Plaintiff, Tyler, was involuntarily committed to a mental hospital nearly 
thirty years ago after his wife of over two decades left him for another 
man.134  In the years between his hospital discharge in 1986 and 2012, there 
was no evidence of mental illness.135  Despite this fact, Tyler was denied the 
purchase of a gun in 2011.  His chief challenge in the present case was that 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) unconstitutionally placed a permanent ban on his 
fundamental right to bear arms.136  Here, the court decided not to blindly 
apply the statute, which the Supreme Court expressly enumerated as a 
“presumptively lawful” restriction in Heller.137  Instead, it reasoned that an 
individual who was previously involuntarily committed should be allowed 
to argue against 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) if he or she believes that they no 
longer poses a danger to society.138
 130.  Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 2018).  
131.  Id. at 201.
 132.  Id. at 203.  
 133.  Id. at 210–11. 
 134.  Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 2016).  
 135.  Id. at 684.  
 136.  Id. at 684.  
 137.  Id. at 687. 
 138.  Id. at 687–88.  
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3.  Summary and Application 
The decision in Tyler suggests that prior involuntary commitment to a 
mental institution does not equate to current mental illness, and that the 
federal law thereby does not automatically bar individuals who were once 
involuntary committed from possessing firearms.  In contrast, ERPOs are 
targeted at dispossessing people who are shown to pose a current danger to 
themselves or others.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the Sixth 
Circuit could uphold an ERPO law because it relies on indications of 
dangerous behaviors which suggest the individual is currently a danger 
and/or mentally ill.  Further, as the court decided in Stimmel, such a 
categorical ban on a group of individuals is permissible if it reasonably 
serves to enforce the governmental interest of public safety. 
G.  United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
1. United States v. Skoien
Defendant, Skoien, had twice been convicted of misdemeanor crimes 
of domestic violence when he was found in possession of a shotgun.139  As a 
condition of his guilty plea, he reserved the right to bring a facial challenge 
against 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).140  The court reasoned that Section 922(g)(9) 
was rooted in the belief that people who have been convicted of a violent 
offense in the past are more likely to commit similarly violent acts in the 
future.141  Therefore, it becomes imperative to keep “the most lethal weapon” 
out of the hands of domestic violence misdemeanants.142  By this logic, the 
court decided to uphold Section 922(g)(9) against Defendant’s facial 
challenge.143
2. United States v. Yancey
The court here reasoned that Congress intended to exclude certain 
individuals who are “presumptively risky people” from possessing firearms 
by passing section 922(g) of the federal code.144  Congress acted within its 
constitutional bounds in doing so because it is “substantially related to the 
important governmental interest in preventing violent crime.”145  The court 
 139.  United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 140.  Id.
 141.  Id. at 642.  
142.  Id. at 643.  
 143.  Id. at 645. 
 144.  United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 145.  Id. at 687.  
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also drew an analogy between habitual drug abusers and the mentally ill, 
stating that both categories of individuals “are more likely to have difficulty 
exercising self-control, making it dangerous for them to possess deadly 
firearms.”146  Further, with respect to commitment to a mental institution, the 
court appeared to decide that such a commitment legitimizes a lifetime ban 
on firearm possession.147
3. Rhein v. Pryor
The Illinois Compiled Statutes (the “ILCS”) contain a provision that 
allows the Illinois Department of State Police to revoke an individual’s 
license to acquire or possess a firearm if the Department finds that, at the 
time of issuance, the individual’s mental condition was “of such a nature that 
it pose[d] a clear and present danger to the applicant, any other person or 
persons or the community.”148  The ILCS was recently amended to define 
“clear and present danger” as: 
[A] person who: (1) communicates a serious threat of physical 
violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or poses a clear 
and imminent risk of serious physical injury to himself, herself, 
or another person as determined by a physician, clinical 
psychologist, or qualified examiner; or (2) demonstrates 
threatening physical or verbal behavior, such as violent, suicidal, 
or assaultive threats, actions, or other behavior, as determined by 
a physician, clinical psychologist, qualified examiner, school 
administrator, or law enforcement official.149
Here, one of the plaintiffs claimed that (1) he did not have a mental 
illness and (2) that therefore his firearm license was improperly revoked.150
While the court ruled that the plaintiff’s claims may advance past the motion 
to dismiss at issue here, it noted that if it is later found that the nature of the 
plaintiff’s mental condition posed a clear danger to himself or others, his 
claim that his Second Amendment rights were deprived will be 
unsuccessful.151
 146.  Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685.  
 147.  Id. at 686.  
 148.  430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/8 (LEXIS through 2017 Legis. Sess.).  
 149.  430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/1.1 (LEXIS through 2017 Legis. Sess.).  
 150.  Rhein v. Pryor, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36305 at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014). 
 151.  Id. at *17. 
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4.  Summary and Application 
The decision in Skoien to uphold 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) against facial 
challenges bodes well for the passage of an ERPO law in the Seventh Circuit.  
The court’s decision hinged on the amount of scientific proof regarding the 
high rate of recidivism of domestic abusers and the danger posed to partners 
and spouses of those abusers.  Similarly, the studies done by the Consortium 
for Risk-Based Firearms Policy and the FBI show clear signs of concerning 
conduct which are often readily apparent to those closest to a potential 
shooter in the time leading up to that shooter’s attack.  Such a present threat 
to public safety should not be overlooked, and, in light of the Skoien decision, 
the Seventh Circuit may be open to such a comparison. 
Further, the decision in Yancey suggests that the Seventh Circuit would 
uphold an ERPO law because it is “substantially related to the important 
governmental interest in preventing violent crime.”152  Under Yancey, the 
Seventh Circuit also appears more stringent than other circuits—like the 
Sixth Circuit, for example—by ruling in favor of the lifetime ban of 
individuals who were once committed to mental institutions.  It will thus be 
more difficult for individuals to bring a claim against an ERPO law based on 
the argument that there is no evidence of continued or reoccurring mental 
illness after an earlier commitment to a mental institution. 
The Rhein decision suggests that an ERPO law could be integrated in 
the Northern District of Illinois since the ILCS already provides for much of 
the restrictions contained in California’s ERPO law.  In fact, the ILCS 
appears to be more restrictive because it allows for an indefinite revocation 
of firearm possession for individuals who displayed evidence of mental 
illness at the time of the issuance of their license. 
H.  United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
1. United States v. Bena
In its analysis of the constitutionality of domestic violence restrictions 
on firearm possession, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that, even though federal 
law did not prohibit firearm possession by the mentally ill until 1968, 
Congress had long since sought to keep firearms out of the possession of 
dangerous classes of individuals.153  Because this type of restriction is in 
place to “promote the government’s interest in public safety consistent with 
our common law tradition,” the court held that the Second Amendment does 
 152.  Yancey, 621 F.3d at 687. 
 153.  United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1182–83 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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not prohibit such restrictions.154  This reasoning is consistent with classical 
republican philosophy, which tied the right to bear arms with being a 
“virtuous citizen.”155
2. United States v. Seay
Defendant, Seay, was convicted of distrusting and possessing 
marijuana.156  During a search subsequent to his arrest, police found four 
firearms at Defendant’s residence.  He was thereby indicted for possessing a 
firearm while using a controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(3).  Defendant argued that the indictment violated his Second 
Amendment rights.157  However, the court refrained from considering 
Defendant’s arguments.  In so doing, it cited past decisions within the circuit 
as well as in other circuits which dictated that this and other sections of § 
922(g) are facially constitutional.158
3.  Summary and Application 
Bena suggests that the Eighth Circuit would uphold an ERPO law 
because it is aimed specifically at individuals who pose a danger to 
themselves or others, which the Eighth Circuit held was not a restriction 
prohibited by the Second Amendment.  Further, it would be difficult for a 
defendant in the Eighth Circuit to argue that an ERPO is facially 
unconstitutional as comparable sections of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) have been 
held to be constitutional, as was reiterated in Seay.
I.  United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
1. Pyles v. Winters
Plaintiff, Pyles, was working as a transportation planner at the Oregon 
Department of Transportation when he began suffering from “perceived 
mental decline” in 2009.159  When told he was being placed on administrative 
leave by his manager, Plaintiff caused a scene in the office for about 20 
minutes before he was escorted off the premises by police officers.160
Plaintiff’s actions on that day were so violent that, in the days that followed, 
 154.  Bena, 664 F.3d at 1184.  
 155.  Id. at 1183.  
 156.  United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 920 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 157.  Seay, 620 F.3d at 920.  
 158.  Id. at 924.  
 159.  Pyles v. Winters, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96227 at *2 (D. Or. July, 9, 2013).  
 160.  Id. at *2–3.  
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 107 Side B      02/26/2019   14:13:21
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 107 Side B      02/26/2019   14:13:21
SHEN_UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2019 1:42 PM
708 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:3 
many of his co-workers felt unsafe even when they got home after work.161
As a result, Plaintiff’s district manager notified the local Sheriff’s Office of 
the events that occurred and asked that Plaintiff’s activities be monitored, in 
case Plaintiff returned to the office and displayed further violent behavior.162
Two days after he was told he was going to be placed on administrative 
leave, Plaintiff purchased a firearm and the district manager was notified of 
the purchase.163  Further investigation revealed that Plaintiff had actually 
purchased three firearms in those two days—two handguns and an AK-type 
assault rifle.164  Plaintiff claimed the timing of these purchases was merely 
coincidental and that he believed he never posed a danger to anyone, 
including himself.165  Police seized Plaintiff’s firearms soon thereafter and 
he was transported to a hospital for a mental health evaluation.  The 
evaluation did not indicate that Plaintiff was a danger to himself or others.166
Plaintiff argued that the seizure of his firearms was a violation of his Second 
Amendment rights, particularly because the mental health evaluation proved 
that he was not mentally ill.167
The court ruled that the results of the mental health evaluation were 
irrelevant; it did not matter that Plaintiff was not actually mentally ill.168  The 
police lawfully seized Plaintiff’s firearms because they had probable cause 
to suspect that Plaintiff might be mentally ill and a danger to himself or 
others.169  Furthermore, Plaintiff’s firearms were returned to him “within a 
reasonable amount of time” following the results of his mental health 
evaluation.170  Therefore, Plaintiff’s Second Amendment claim was 
dismissed. 
2. United States v. Garretson
Defendant, Garretson, was reported for producing and distributing 
marijuana.171  When police searched his residence pursuant to this report, 
they found him in possession of multiple firearms.  At the time of the search, 
 161.  Pyles, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96227 at *4.  
 162.  Id. at *3.  
 163.  Id. at *2–4.  
 164.  Id. at *4.  
165.  Id. at *5.  
 166.  Id. at *6–7.  
 167.  Pyles, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96227 at *8.  
 168.  Id. at *16.  
 169.  Id.
 170.  Id.
 171.  United States v. Garretson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154246 at *2–4 (D. Nev. June 12, 
2013).
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there was an Extended Order for Protection Against Domestic Violence filed 
against Defendant.  He was therefore indicted for possession of firearms in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).172  Against this, Defendant argued the 
statute violated his Second Amendment rights, as applied.173
The court referred to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Mahin, in which the Fourth Circuit ruled that § 922(g)(8)’s prohibition was 
“temporally limited and therefore ‘exceedingly narrow.’”174  The temporary 
burden is only instated to prevent “a particular risk of future abuse.”175  Here, 
the court decided that the mere one-year duration of the domestic violence 
order—which was shorter than the two year duration at issue in Mahin—
along with the credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner 
was enough justification to enforce § 922(g)(8), as applied, upon 
Defendant.176
3.  Summary and Application 
Pyles implies that a mental health evaluation proving the lack of a threat 
of danger to one’s self or others is irrelevant, so long as the firearms are 
seized upon probable cause and are returned to the owner “within a 
reasonable amount of time” after the mental health evaluation is 
conducted.177  The decision in Garretson further enforces the 
constitutionality of a temporary burden on one’s Second Amendment rights 
when there is threat of physical safety.178  Together, these decisions suggest 
the Ninth Circuit would likely uphold an ERPO law because ERPOs are 
temporary and imposed against those who are a danger to themselves or 
others.  Once the one-year period lapses, the order may be renewed, but if it 
is not renewed, then the individual may request the return of his or her 
firearms. 
J.  United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
1. United States v. Gillman
Defendant, Gillman, was found in possession of a firearm after his ex-
girlfriend filed a protective order against him.  He contested the 
 172.  Garretson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154246 at *3-4. 
 173.  Id. at *6.  
 174.  United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 125 (4th Cir. 2012).  
 175.  Garretson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154246 at *18.  
 176.  Id. at *18–20.  
 177.  Pyles, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96227 at *16.   
 178.  Garretson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154246 at *18.  
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constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), arguing that that section of the 
statute unduly punishes people who do not pose a threat to public safety and, 
as applied to him, restricted his Second Amendment rights even though there 
was no evidence that he posed a danger to anyone.179  Defendant maintained 
that the protective order held against him was based on a property crime—
slashing his ex-girlfriend’s tires—rather than threat of bodily harm and 
therefore he should not be subject to § 922(g)(8). 
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah reasoned that, while there is no clear 
definition for a “presumptively lawful” restriction, § 922(g)(8) likely falls 
under this category.180  Section 922(g)(8) is narrower in scope and “more 
limited in its temporal applicability” when compared to the statute at issue 
in Heller.181  The statute here targeted a limited group of citizens who may 
present legitimate concerns in relation to the safety of an intimate partner 
and is therefore narrow in scope.182  Thus, the court upheld the federal statute 
as applied against the Defendant.
2.  Summary and Application 
Case law is limited in this circuit and therefore no definitive conclusion 
can be drawn.  However, the narrow scope and temporal applicability of 
ERPOs are comparable to that of § 922(g)(8), suggesting that an ERPO law 
will likely be upheld, at least in the limited jurisdiction of the Central 
Division of the District of Utah. 
K.  United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
There is virtually no case law in the Eleventh Circuit addressing a 
Second Amendment challenge to a law analogous to an ERPO law.  
However, the Eleventh Circuit has issued decisions categorically upholding 
more aggressive lifetime bans on firearm possession.  Such decisions reflect 
the circuit’s understanding that “the right recognized in Heller is a qualified 
right—not intended to ‘cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.’”183  This suggests that 
 179.  Garretson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154246 at *4.  
 180.  Id. at *7.  
 181.  Id.
 182.  Id. at *8.  
 183.  United States v. McIlwain, 772 F.3d 688, 698 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27); see also United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 
(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that “statutory restrictions of firearm possession, such as § 
922(g)(1), are a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of 
people” and the plaintiff, “by virtue of his felony conviction, falls within such a class”).  
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the Eleventh Circuit might uphold an ERPO law as a similar statutory 
restriction of firearm possession for certain classes of people who have been 
determined more likely to be a danger to themselves or others. 
L.  United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit 
1. Schrader v. Holder
Plaintiff, Schrader, was convicted of misdemeanor assault and battery 
forty years prior to the filing of this case.  When he was subsequently denied 
the purchase of a firearm forty years after the conviction, he learned that he 
was barred from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).184  In considering 
Plaintiff’s constitutional challenge, the court reasoned that Congress 
originally enacted the statute to keep firearms away from individuals “who 
might be expected to misuse them.”185  The court ruled that § 922(g)(1) 
survived intermediate scrutiny because disarming “common-law 
misdemeanants as a class is substantially related to the important 
governmental objective” of preventing gun violence.186
2.  Summary and Application 
The reasoning in Schrader is applicable in the ERPO context because it 
suggests an ERPO law would survive intermediate scrutiny because it is 
based on a similar rationale that people “expected to misuse” firearms may 
permissibly be prohibited from possessing them.  Thus, though there is 
limited case law, the ruling in Schrader bodes well for the success of an 
ERPO law in this jurisdiction. 
Conclusion
Something needs to be done about the amount of gun violence in this 
country.  For many years, the shooting at Columbine High School in 1999 
was referred to as one of the deadliest massacres in history.  Now, it is no 
longer even among the 10 deadliest shootings in modern U.S. history.187
While there continues to be debate over the true cause of these repeated mass 
 184.  Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 982-83 (2013).  
 185.  Id. at 990. 
 186.  Id. at 990.  
 187.  AJ Willingham et al., 19 years ago, Columbine shook American to its core. Now, it’s not 
even among the 10 deadliest shootings in modern US history, CNN (Apr. 20, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/07/health/deadliest-mass-shootings-columbine-in-modern-us-
history-trnd/index.html.  
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shootings, there is at least a proven correlation between more guns and 
higher firearm homicide rates.188  Due to the Supreme Court precedent in 
D.C. v. Heller, the control the NRA exerts on Congress,189 and the anti-gun 
control sentiments of at least one third of the American population,190 it is 
unlikely that a strong-headed movement in the direction of general gun 
restrictions will yield any results.  One compromise, that has been agreed 
upon by representatives on both sides of the political divide as an acceptable 
means through which to at least rein in the amount of access to guns by those 
who pose a danger to themselves or others, is the type of ERPO law that 
exists in California, Washington, Oregon, Florida, Delaware, Illinois, 
Maryland, and Massachusetts. 
While only time will tell whether such a law will be passed in each of 
the remaining 42 states, this Note posits that passage of ERPO laws in each 
of the 12 circuits is plausible and perhaps even necessary.  Existing case law 
in each of these jurisdictions has shown that the limited and specific nature 
of ERPOs will likely withstand a constitutional challenge.  All that stands in 
the way of the passage of such laws is an unwillingness to place boundaries 
on Second Amendment rights. 
Hopefully, this incorrect perception of common sense gun laws will be 
changed in the coming years, because the reality is that these limited 
restrictions on firearm ownership are not aimed at infringing on individual 
rights.  Rather, they are aimed at protecting innocent lives from gun violence.  
If lawmakers can be persuaded to simply shift their point of view, it becomes 
an easy decision to pass minimally-restrictive, common sense gun laws to 
protect American citizens from the dangers of guns when placed in the wrong 
hands.
 188.  Max Fisher et al., What Explains U.S. Mass Shootings? International Comparisons 
Suggest an Answer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/world/amer 
icas/mass-shootings-us-international.html.  
 189.  See, e.g. Dominic Rushe, Why is the National Rifle Association so powerful?, THE
GUARDIAN (May 4, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/nov/17/nra-gun-lobby-
gun-control-congress. 
 190.  Steven Shepard, Gun control support surges in polls, POLITICO (Feb. 28, 2018), https://w 
ww.politico.com/story/2018/02/28/gun-control-polling-parkland-430099. 
